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attraction was a desire for action and a willingness to take chances. Working 
together, the three gradually developed and executed the strategy that led to 
the capture of Vicksburg and the closing of the river to the Confederacy. 
One of Hearn's most striking observations concerns similarities between 
Porter and the political general Benjamin F. Butler that were revealed when 
the two leaders were assigned to cooperate in the capture of Fort Fisher at the 
mouth of the Cape Fear River. Both men were, Hearn notes, "intellectually 
gifted and independent thinkers whose talent for innovation ranged from the 
brilliant to the absurd" (p. 274). The two worked well together until the time 
came to carry through with their plans. Then Porter's push for action con-
flicted with Butler's sluggishness and brought them to a parting of the ways. 
Butler's successor in the Fort Fisher operation, Major General Alfred H. 
Terry, was one of the few volunteer officers for whom Porter retained respect 
after service together. The key was a willingness to fight. 
Porter's career during the Civil War was brilliant. His rise from lieutenant 
to rear admiral paralleled that of George A. Custer, but Porter's role was of 
much greater importance. Unlike the army, which had to contend with Re-
construction and pacifying the frontier, the navy had no clear mission follow-
ing the war, and the remainder of Porter's career lacked the excitement of his 
younger days. His service as head of the naval academy and his involvement 
in bureaucratic maneuvers regarding the role of the navy are of interest only 
to specialists, and Hearn wisely offers only a brief summary of Porter's last 
years. 
Hearn is careful in the claims that he makes for Porter's importance and 
takes note of his flaws. The research is solid, and the book is quite readable. 
The maps have been copied from Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel's 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New York, 1887-88) and the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (30 
vols.; Washington, D.C., 1894-1922) and could be improved. Otherwise, this 
is a fine volume and probably the last biography of David Dixon Porter that 
we will need for some time to come. 
Tarleton State University MICHAEL D. PIERCE 
Bentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman and Johnston. By Nathaniel Cheairs 
Hughes Jr. Civil War America. (Chapel Hill and London: University of 
North Carolina Press, c. 1996. pp. xxii, 336. $37.50, ISBN 0-8078-2281-7.) 
Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr. has probably written the definitive work 
on the battle of Bentonville, the final battle between Confederate General 
Joseph E. Johnston and Union General William T. Sherman. This engagement 
was the conclusion of the long process of Sherman's invasion of the South, 
which began at Atlanta in June 1864, moved to Savannah, and through the 
Carolinas. 
For those individuals who like to follow the development of a battle regi-
ment by regiment, this is the book to read since the author details in an easi-
ly followed manner the placement of troops over the three-day period of 
March 19 through 21, 1865. One almost experiences the trauma of the battle 
and participates in the decisions made by the leading generals. 
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But Hughes does more than that-he places the battle in the context of the 
closing days of the Confederacy. Brief biographical vignettes of the major 
participants help the reader to understand not only what expertise and knowl-
edge the generals brought to the battle but also what inadequacies and per-
sonal antagonisms existed among the leadership. The final chapter adequate-
ly analyzes the motivations and qualifications of the leading generals on both 
sides and evaluates their tactics, successful or not. Those generals who do not 
come off well are Braxton Bragg, William P. Carlin, Jefferson C. Davis, and 
Lafayette McLaws. 
It is Hughes's contention that Sherman's main objective was to occupy 
Goldsboro, north of the Neuse River, unite with Generals John M. Schofield 
and Alfred H. Terry from the East, and assist Ulysses S. Grant against Robert 
E. Lee in Virginia. Therefore, Sherman underestimated the forces under 
Johnston, did not believe he would attack, and considered Johnston to be a 
mere nuisance in his march northward. With Goldsboro on his mind, Sher-
man exposed the left wing of his army, which was then open to attack by an 
entrenched Johnston. On the other hand, Johnston thought that he could take 
on Sherman's left wing and, even against great odds, cripple the rest of Sher-
man's army. Besides, Johnston needed to prove that the Army of Tennessee 
was capable of successfully taking the offensive, in spite of the history of this 
army in the West. 
The book is well illustrated and has a series of maps that help the reader 
follow the action. One is still confused, however, about the location of Black 
River and Black Creek and other minor sites; knowledge of those positions 
would have been helpful in understanding the engagement. The appendix in-
cludes the military organization of the forces on both sides as well as vi-
gnettes explaining what happened to key officers after Bentonville. The book 
is adequately documented with eighty pages of notes and bibliography. 
Questions still linger, however, as to why Johnston thought he could stop 
Sherman, and why Johnston allowed his army to remain on the field on the 
second and third days in spite of the odds against it, and, even yet, why Sher-
man did not use his superior forces to drive Johnston from the field on March 
21? There are no adequate answers, and Hughes offers none, except to use 
the metaphor that Bentonville represented the Confederacy itself, "bright 
hopes drowned in dark swamp water" (p. 231). To Hughes, Sherman's failure 
to press the fight was "the capstone of his magnificent Carolina Campaign" 
(p. 230), and for Johnston, Bentonville represented an opportunity for "in-
spired military leadership" that failed. 
An alternative view with more personal interest stories and details of Sher-
man's advance through the Carolinas preceding Bentonville is presented by 
Mark L. Bradley in Last Stand in the Carolinas: The Battle of Bentonville 
(Campbell, Calif., 1996). 
Liberty University CLINE E. HALL 
Sherman's Horsemen: Union Cavalry Operations in the Atlanta Campaign. 
By David Evans. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, c. 1996. Pp. xxxviii, 645. $40.00, ISBN 0-253-32963-9.) 
